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Abstract 
In this paper it is argued that the decision in Miller v The Queen [2016] HCA 30 is not 
supported by the common law precedents in Australia nor the historical English precedents. It 
is argued that the change of normative position theory invoked by the majority judges is just 
stated as a rule rather than as a positive justification, which is an assertion that has never been 
developed into a plausible theory. Moreover, the policy considerations cannot work as 
convincing justifications for extended joint enterprise liability. It is submitted that 
assisting/encouraging is normatively different from and less harmful and dangerous than 
perpetration; and that making an assister/encourager fully liable for the target crime goes 
against principles of fair labelling and proportionate punishment. It is further submitted that 
the unfairness and injustice in complicity liability is doubled in the context of extended joint 
enterprise showing the urgency of abolition of it in Australia.  
I Introduction 
 
Arguably, a doctrine of ‘extended joint enterprise’ was enacted by judicial fiat in 
Australia in 1995.1  It appears the judges deciding McAuliffe v The Queen were 
																																																								
* Lecturer, School of Law, University of Surrey, United Kingdom. 
1 McAuliffe v The Queen [1995] 183 CLR 108. The majority judges in Miller v The Queen [2016] HCA 30, para 2 
acknowledge its doctrinal foundations cannot be traced beyond the 1980s when they state, ‘These criticisms were 
invoked in support of an application to re-open and overrule McAuliffe in Clayton v The Queen (2006). By 
majority, the Court declined to do so. Among the majority's reasons for that refusal was the observation that 
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confounded by Chan Wing-Siu v The Queen—a 1985 decision of the Privy Council.2  
Their confusion about what Sir Robin Cooke was expounding in Chan Wing-Siu v 
The Queen led them to create a new doctrine of complicity liability. The doctrine of 
‘extended joint enterprise complicity’ has no doctrinal lineage in the common law in 
Australia before 1995.3 There were factual situations involving a common purpose, 
underlying crime and collateral crime, but these cases when examined closely prove 
to be straightforward cases of intentional encouragement.4 On the facts as presented in 
the earlier precedents, there was ample evidence for a jury to infer that by joining the 
underlying criminal enterprise the accessory sent a message of encouragement to the 
perpetrator in relation to the collateral crime. Moreover, in these cases there was 
ample evidence to infer that the encouragement was intended to encourage P to 
perpetrate the anticipated collateral crime.    
A similar error was made in R v Powell,5 but the Supreme Court of the United 
Kingdom and Privy Council corrected that error in 2016. In R v Jogee6 and Ruddock v 
The Queen7 the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom and the Board of the Privy 
Council overruled R v Powell and Chan Wing-Siu v The Queen to bring the law back 
into line with the common law as it stood for centuries prior to Chan Wing-Siu v The 																																																																																																																																																														
principles consistent with McAuliffe form part of the common law in other countries. These principles are 
commonly traced to the decision of the Privy Council in Chan Wing-Siu v The Queen.’ Id para 37 ‘McAuliffe 
builds on the principles enunciated in Johns.’ [Emphasis added.] 
2 Chan Wing-Siu v The Queen [1985] AC 168. 
3 The earlier cases required intention and factual encouragement. The encouragement was inferred by the fact that 
the accessory intentionally joined the joint enterprise intending her act of joining to send a message of 
encouragement to the perpetrator of the anticipated collateral crime. D J Baker, Reinterpreting Criminal 
Complicity and Inchoate Participation Offences (Oxford: Routledge, 2016), ch. 2 citing R v Johns [1978] 1 
NSWLR 282, 285-86; R v Dunn [1930] 30 SR (NSW) 210, 214 R v Dorrey [1970] 3 NSWLR 351, 353; R v Adams 
[1932] VLR 222, 223-24; R v Kalinowski [1930] 31 SR (NSW) 377, 380-81; R v Dowdle [1901] 26 VLR 637, 
639-41; R v Surridge [1942] 42 SR (NSW) 278, 282-83; R v Grand [1903] 3 SR (NSW) 216, 218. 
4 Ibid.  
5 [1999] 1 AC 1.  
6 [2016] UKSC 8. 
7 [2016] UKPC 7. 
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Queen. The High Court of Australia has refused to follow suit and has given some 
doubtful policy reasons to justify retaining the doctrine of extended joint enterprise 
that it minted in 1995. In this paper Miller v The Queen (2016) will be used to explore 
the moral foundations of complicity with the aim of demonstrating that the law of 
complicity should be abolished in its entirety and be replaced with independent 
crimes of assistance and encouragement akin to those provided for in sections 44-46 
of the Serious Crime Act 2007 (UK).   
           The moral foundations of complicity has been said to rest on culpable indirect 
causation. 8 It will be argued that assistance and encouragement does not have a 
sufficient causal or normative connection with crimes of another to make the 
normative claim that culpable assistance/encouragement is a moral wrong equal to 
culpable direct perpetration of the anticipated target crime. Free and informed human 
acts break the chain of causation.9 The assister or encourager is one step removed 
from the direct harm doing, which is caused by the independent autonomous choice of 
the perpetrator to use the assistance or to act on the encouragement when perpetrating 
the anticipated target crime. What marks out assistance and encouragement as a 
distinct wrong is that such acts are harmless in themselves, because any harm is 
contingent on the autonomous, informed and free choice of the perpetrator.10 The 
normative difference between the harmfulness of perpetration and 
assistance/encouragement also rests on the fact that assisting and encouraging is far 
less dangerous than direct perpetration where the perpetrator has the sole say and 
control over whether the anticipated target crime is perpetrated.  In this type of case 																																																								
8 J Gardner, ‘Moore on Complicity and Causality,’ (2008) 156 U Pa L Rev PENNumbra 432, 436; M S Moore, 
‘Causing, Aiding, and the Superfluity of Accomplice Liability,’ (2008) 156 U Pa L Rev 395; S Kadish, Blame and 
Punishment: Essays in the Criminal Law, (New York: MacMillan Publishers, 1987) at 162 ff.  
9 R v Kennedy [2008] 1 AC 269. 
10  Glanville Williams, ‘Finis for Novus Actus? [1989] Cambridge L J 391, 392. 
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there is no duress, deception or coercion; the perpetrator is not an innocent agent and 
consequently is fully responsible for the end harm.  
There is also a moral difference between intending to assist and encourage and 
intending to perpetrate. If D1 intends to kill V and picks up a knife and pushes it 
through V’s heart, D1 is in a very different ‘state of evilness of mind’ (motivation to 
directly kill a human being up front and live) than D2, who has supplied the knife 
intentionally, but is a person who would never kill as he does not have the evilness of 
mind, nerve or psychology to directly kill using his own hands and is only able to 
intend such an act be done through the autonomous free acts of another. It is easier to 
imagine killing someone than actually doing it. Did Shakespeare’s Lady Macbeth 
have the same mental wherewithal as Macbeth? He certainly had the wherewithal to 
encourage, but perhaps not to perpetrate.  
It is unfair and unjust to treat a mere assister/encourage in the same way as a 
perpetrator while their wrongdoing and personal culpability are quite different. Such 
unfairness and injustice is doubled in the context of extended joint enterprise liability 
where the defendant is made fully liable for a crime which he did not perpetrate or 
assisted/encouraged another to perpetrate, nor did he intended that crime being 
perpetrated by his confederates. Such a defendant is taking a risk that the collateral 
crime might be committed by joining in the enterprise to do the underlying crime. 
Labelling and punishing such a defendant in the same way as the perpetrator goes 
against the principles of fair labelling and proportionate punishment because the 
crime label and punishment given do not reflect the nature and degree of the 
defendant’s wrongdoing.  
 The change of normative position theory and the policy considerations 
adopted in Miller v The Queen cannot provide a convincing justification for extended 
	 5 
joint enterprise doctrine.  The change of normative position theory has never been 
developed into a plausible theory to justify constructive liability in the context of 
perpetration as it cannot answer the questions why the normative position is changed, 
how it is changed and to what extent it is changed. It is hard to see how this theory 
can do the job in the context of extended criminal enterprise when a person is made 
liable for another’s incidental crime. There is a big moral difference between a person 
taking consequences of his own conduct and taking consequences of the independent 
and autonomous conduct of another. Moreover, the policy reasons given in the 
judgment are not satisfactory either. We cannot achieve easy prosecution at the cost 
of justice and fairness.  
II Common Law Principles of Complicity 
 
The current debate concerns the mental element in complicity and whether it should 
be limited to intention or whether it should also include recklessness. The current law 
in England and Wales11 and most states in the United States12 require intention and 
consequently do not include recklessness as an alternative fault element. In those 
jurisdictions there must be an intentional act of encouragement or assistance and that 
act must be done with the ulterior intention of assisting or encouraging the perpetrator 
to perpetrate the anticipated target crime. D must intend that P act with the requisite 
fault for the anticipated target crime.13  A further constraint in those jurisdictions 
concerns the conduct element, because actual assistance or encouragement is 
required. Association per se is not sufficient for establishing the conduct element. 																																																								
11 R v Jogee [2016] UKSC 8.  
12 See the survey of the law in Rosemond v U.S.  [2014] 134 S.Ct. 1240. 
13 D J Baker, ‘Reinterpreting the Mental Element in Criminal Complicity: Change of Normative Position Theory 
Cannot Rationalize the Current Law,’ (2016) 40 Law & Psychology Review 121.  
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Below it will be argued that the debate should be extended to consider whether 
complicity in its full sense (that is, the procedural mechanism which deems an 
assister/encourager to be a principal/perpetrator) should be abolished and replaced 
with independent crimes of assistance and encouragement. An independent crime 
would label the assister/encourager as an assister or encourager rather than as a 
principal perpetrator. Under such a scheme a person who assists a murder would not 
be convicted and punished for murder, but instead for contravening the 
assistance/encouragement offence. As a consequence, the double constructive liability 
in extended joint criminal enterprise should be abolished as well because the 
defendant’s full liability for the callteral crime is based on the fictitious conclusion 
that by joining in the underlying crime foreseeing the collateral crime he has provided 
assistance/encouragement for the collateral crime.  
In this section a brief outline of why the decision in Miller v The Queen was 
wrongly decided is provided. It will be submitted that the academic research and the 
decision in R v Jogee itself demonstrate that the decision in Miller v The Queen was 
not only wrongly decided, but is grossly unjust. The joint majority (French CJ, Kiefel, 
Bell, Nettle and Gordon JJ) in Miller v The Queen held:  
 
1)  ‘Each party is also guilty of any other crime ("the incidental crime") committed by 
a co-venturer that is within the scope of the agreement ("joint criminal enterprise" 
liability). …Moreover, a party to a joint criminal enterprise who foresees, but does 
not agree to, the commission of the incidental crime in the course of carrying out the 
agreement and who, with that awareness, continues to participate in the enterprise is 
liable for the incidental offence ("extended joint criminal enterprise" liability).’14 
 
																																																								
14 [2016] HCA 30 at para 4.  
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2) ‘The wrong in the case of the party to the joint criminal enterprise lies in the 
mutual embarkation on a crime with the awareness that the incidental crime may be 
committed in executing their agreement.’15 
 
            The High Court of Australia holds that foresight is sufficient fault for the 
defendant even when the mens rea for the collateral crime is specific intention and 
that there needn’t be any encouragement or assistance regarding the collateral crime if 
the accessory foresaw the collateral crime might be perpetrated as an incident of the 
joint enterprise.  
In England and Wales the Supreme Court, held that in complicity cases 
foresight was only ever evidence of intention and that encouragement or assistance 
was needed to establish the conduct requirement in complicity.16 Prior to the decision 
in R v Jogee, Baker argued,  
 
‘[U]ntil the decision in the House of Lords in R v Powell changed law, the foresight 
of possibility rule (i.e. the accessory’s foresight of the collateral crime as a possible 
incident of the underlying joint enterprise), like the probable and natural 
consequences maxim, was a mere maxim of evidence for inferring that the common 
purpose extended to the collateral crime …. What was a maxim of evidence has been 
invoked as a substantive fault element in complicity since 1999, which has had the 
effect of extending the mental element in common purpose complicity to cover 
recklessness….A crime as a foreseen collateral crime of an underlying joint 
																																																								
15 [2016] HCA 30 at para 34. Compare R v Britten [1988] 49 SASR 47, 53-54, holding, ‘The judgment, delivered 
by Sir Robin Cooke in Chan Wing-Siu, discussed the authorities, including Johns v The Queen which lay down the 
well-established principles governing liability of participants in a joint criminal enterprise. The judgment gives no 
indication of any intention to break new legal ground or to extend the grounds upon which criminal liability arises 
in such cases.’ 
16 R v Jogee [2016] UKSC 8, at para 8, 11.  
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enterprise was merely evidence from which an accessory’s intention or conditional 
intention that the perpetrator perpetrates the collateral crime could be inferred. 17 
 
            The Supreme Court held that the law of common purpose complicity took a 
wrong turn since Chan Wing-Siu v The Queen18 equating foresight with intention to 
assist and therefore treating foresight as an inevitable yardstick of common purpose.19 
The maxims of evidence such as foresight of probable and possible consequences, not 
only mirror substantive criminal law fault elements, but also have been blurred with 
them for centuries.’20  The point made here is that the substantive fault doctrine in 
crimes of recklessness is foresight of a possibility or probability that the prohibited 
consequence or conduct might occur. In crimes of negligence the substantive fault 
element is what a reasonable person would have foreseen as the possible or probable 
consequence or as possible or probable conduct of the given action.  A reasonable 
person might foresee that the ‘conduct’ he is assisting will be rape, even though D did 
not intend as much. Added to this mix is the maxim that foresight of a virtual 
certainty can be used to infer that the virtual certainty was intended.21 Scholars have 
also suggested that foresight of a virtually certainty can be a substantive fault doctrine 
																																																								
17 D J Baker, Glanville Williams Textbook of Criminal Law (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2015), §17–069. 
18 [1985] AC 168.  
19 R v Jogee [2016] UKSC 8, at para 87. There are some other voices contending that Chan Wing-Siu did not take a 
wrong turn and that the Supreme Court’s judgement in Jogee is not strongly convincing. See A P Simester, 
“Accessory liability and common unlawful purposes” (2017) 133 Law Quarterly Review 73; Sir R Buxton, ‘Jogee: 
upheaval in secondary liability for murder’ (2016) 5 Criminal Law Review 324; F Stark, ‘The demise of "parasitic 
accessorial liability": substantive judicial law reform, not common law housekeeping’ (2016) 75 (3) Cambridge 
Law Journal 550; David Ormerod and Karl Laird, “Jogee: not the end of a legal saga but the start of one?”(2016) 8 
Criminal Law Review 539.   
20 D J Baker, ‘Foresight in Common Purpose Complicity/Joint Enterprise Complicity: It Is a Maxim of Evidence, 
Not a Substantive Fault Element (October 10, 2012), 51 at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2507529; Baker, 
above note 24, 243.    
21  R v Woollin [1999] 1 A.C. 82, 96. 
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for crimes such as murder,22 rather than just an evidential standard23 for inferring 
direct intention.24  
What is particularly puzzling about the majority decision in Miller v The 
Queen is the judges’ fixation with the Privy Council decision Chan Wing-Siu, because 
the High Court of Australia delivered a more insightful judgement on the law of 
complicity that year. In 1985, Gibbs CJ held,25 
 
‘The very words used in s.351, and the synonyms which express their meanings - e.g. 
help, encourage, advise, persuade, induce, bring about by effort - indicate that a 
particular state of mind is essential before a person can become liable as a secondary 
party for the commission of an offence, even if the offence is one of strict liability. 
… “It will be observed that all these definitions have nothing whatever to do with the 
probability that the forbidden result would follow upon the accessory's conduct; and 
that they all demand that he in some sort associate himself with the venture, that he 
participate in it as in something that he wishes to bring about, that he seek by his 
action to make it succeed. All the words used - even the most colourless 'abet' - carry 
an implication of purposive attitude towards it.”’ 
 
Gibbs CJ held that knowledge can be used to infer intention and that oblique 
intention can be inferred in cases where D believed as a matter of virtual certainty that 																																																								
22  G Williams, ‘Oblique Intention’, (1987) 46 Cambridge LJ 417; A R White, ‘Intention, Purpose, Foresight and 
Desire,’ (1976) 92(4) L Q R 569;  
23 Compare R v Matthews [2003] 2 Crim. App. 461, 476 suggesting it is mere evidence of direct intention and 
therefore is not also an alternative substantive fault element for murder.  
24 Baker, above note 30, §4.3; Simester et al, Criminal Law Theory and Doctrine, (London: Hart, 2016), §5.1(iv); 
W W Cook, ‘Act, Intention, and Motive in the Criminal Law’, (1916) 26 Yale L J 645, 655.  
25 Giorgianni v The Queen [1985] 156 CLR 473 at para 6. Gibbs CJ uses the term willful blindness to refer to 
oblique intention, which does make his judgment appear somewhat confused. Gibbs CJ states, ‘Further it is not 
correct to say that a person may be convicted of aiding, abetting, counselling or procuring the commission of an 
offence simply because he has acted recklessly. …. Recklessness, in the sense of not caring whether the facts exist 
or not, would be relevant only if it too was virtually equivalent to knowledge, in other words only if it amounted to 
wilful blindness.’ Id para 15.  
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a circumstance existed and deliberately avoided checking whether it did or would 
exist. The judgment uses confusing terminology in trying to explain that a ‘belief that 
it is virtually certain that a circumstance exists’ is the same thing as actual knowledge, 
because it used the ambiguous term ‘wilful blindness’. Notwithstanding that issue, it 
is clear that case does not allow recklessness as an alternative substantive fault 
element in complicity.  In 2014, Learned Hand J’s interpretation of the law, which 
persuaded Gibbs CJ, was invoked by the Supreme Court of the United States26 in 
support of its interpretation of the law as requiring intention, even though Peoni27 
itself was argued as a natural probable consequence case. The majority in Miller v The 
Queen might assert that the decision in Giorgianni v The Queen does not apply since 
the facts in that case did not involve a joint enterprise.28  After all, the High Court 
held that ‘extended joint enterprise’ is a sui generis doctrine.  It claims the doctrine 
started to develop in Johns v The Queen29, but scholars have argued to the contrary 
that Johns supports R v Jogee.30 The majority in R v Jogee also held that Johns was 
supportive of its decision.31  More importantly, there is a line of significant Australian 
authorities involving joint enterprise factual situations that hold that the mental 
element in complicity is intention.32  The general principle announced in these cases 
is taken from the poaching cases referred to in R v Jogee.  
																																																								
26  Rosemond v U.S.  [2014] 134 S.Ct. 1240. 
27 ‘The prosecution's argument is that, as Peoni put the bills in circulation and knew that Regno would be likely, 
not to pass them himself, but to sell them to another guilty possessor, the possession of the second buyer was a 
natural consequence of Peoni’s original act, with which he might be charged.’ United States v. Peoni [1938] 100 
F.2d 401. 
28 See the comments in Clayton v The Queen [2006] 81 ALJR 439, para 102; Gillard v The Queen [2003] 219 CLR 
1, para 50. 
29  [1980] 143 CLR 108.    
30 Baker, above note 24 at 218, citing R v Johns [1978] 1 NSWLR 282, 285-86. 
31 R v Jogee [2016] UKSC 8, para 67.  
32 R v Johns [1978] 1 NSWLR 282, 285-86; R v Dunn [1930] 30 SR (NSW) 210, 214 R v Dorrey [1970] 3 
NSWLR 351, 353; R v Adams [1932] VLR 222, 223-24; R v Kalinowski [1930] 31 SR (NSW) 377, 380-81; R v 
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The law in Australia before McAuliffe v The Queen is summarised in a passage 
from R v Surridge.33 
 
‘Thus, if two persons agree that one of them shall kill or inflict grievous bodily harm 
on another party whilst the other stands by and keeps watch or otherwise assists, the 
latter is guilty of murder as an accomplice if the third party is killed, since he is a 
principal in the second degree. Again, if they agree that the active party shall commit 
a crime, and agree also, expressly or tacitly, that if resistance is offered any necessary 
violence may be used to overcome it, including killing or inflicting grievous bodily 
harm, then if the active party intentionally kills or inflicts grievous bodily harm 
which causes death, in order to overcome resistance, the other party is guilty of 
murder, because the killing was within the common purpose. If the killing amounted 
only to manslaughter by the active party, the other party is also guilty only of 
manslaughter.”’ 
 
These cases adopt the general principle that could be traced right back to Lord 
Dacre’s Case. 34  There have been aberrant decisions over the centuries. 
Unquestionably, the natural probable consequence doctrine and also the foresight of 
possibility doctrine have been used as substitutes for a doctrine of intention in some 
of the cases over the centuries,35 but the scholarly research demonstrates that the bulk 
of cases required intention.36  This also is buttressed with the supporting arguments, 
principles and precedents quoted in the dissenting judgments of Kirby J in Clayton v 
																																																																																																																																																														
Dowdle [1901] 26 VLR 637, 639-41; R v Surridge [1942] 42 SR (NSW) 278, 282-83; R v Grand [1903] 3 SR 
(NSW) 216, 218..  
33 [1942] 42 SR (NSW) 278, 282-83. 
34 [1535] 72 ER 458. 
35 R v Jogee [2016] UKSC 8, para. 20.  
36 Baker, above note 3, ch. 2.  
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The Queen37 and Gageler J in Miller v The Queen. The majority in Miller v The 
Queen38 also misquote Foster by failing to quote in full the passages from Foster so 
that the meaning and context of what was being asserted is lost. Foster held:  
 
‘If the Principal totally and substantially varieth, if being solicited to commit a 
Felony of One kind He wilfully and knowingly committeth a Felony of Another, He 
will stand alone in that Offence, and the Person soliciting will not be involved in his 
Guilt.’  
…. 
‘But if the Principal in Substance complieth with the Temptation, varying only in 
Circumstance of Time or Place, or in the Manner of Execution, in these Cases the 
Person soliciting to the Offence will, if Absent, be an Accessary Before the Fact, if 
Present a Principal. For the Substantial, the Criminal Part of the Temptation, be it 
Advice, Command, or Hire, is complied with. A. Commandeth B. to Murder C. by 
Poison, B. doth it by Sword, or other Weapon, or by any other Means. A. is 
Accessary to this Murder. For the Murder of C, was the Object principally in his 
Contemplation, and that is Effected.’  
…. 
‘So where the Principal goeth beyond the Terms of the Solicitation, if in the Event 
the Felony committed was a probable Consequence of what was Ordered or advised 
the Person giving such Orders or Advice will be an Accessary to that Felony. A. 
upon some Affront given by B. ordereth his Servant to way-lay Him and give Him a 
sound Beating; the Servant doth so, and B. dieth of this Beating. A. is Accessary to 
this Murder.’39 
 
																																																								
37 [2006] 81 ALJR 439. Kirby J was regarded as the intellectual leader in the Court in his day. 
38 [2016] HCA 30 at para 6 where they reference the use of the ‘natural probable consequence’ maxim out of the 
context in which Foster discussed and applied it. The majority in R v Jogee [2016] UKSC 8, para 20 also quote the 
wrong passages from Foster, but seem not to confuse the evidential maxim from the substantive fault element.    
39 M Foster, Crown Law (Oxford: Clarendon, 1762), 369-370.  
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‘These Cases are all governed by One and the Same Principle. The Advice, 
Solicitation, or Orders in Substance were pursued, and were extremely flagitious on 
the Part of A.’ 
 
Thereafter, Foster refers to what would now be conceptualised as a conditional 
intention case and an oblique intention case.40 When these passages are read in full it 
is plain for all to see that they do not adopt objective fault as the substantive fault 
element. The facts in these cases refer to direct instigation where the accessory 
intends or obliquely intends the end crime and therefore it is irrelevant whether 
different means are used by the perpetrator to achieve the end that was intended.41 
These cases also refer to unintended consequences (consequences that are unintended 
but which might be said to be a natural probable consequence) flowing from acts that 
D intended to encourage P to perpetrate. Foster holds it is no defence for D to assert 
that D only intended P to inflict GBH, if that GBH causes V’s death—since a natural 
probable consequence of GBH could be death. The probability of death being caused 
by GBH is debatable, but that is beside the point, since this is no more than an early 
maxim for inferring fault and equally an early attempt to justify constructive liability 
for both the accessory and perpetrator.  None of these cases refer to joint enterprise 
liability. Foster’s view on joint enterprises is as stated in the Three Soldiers case.42 
The Three Soldiers case required a common intention with respect to any collateral 
																																																								
40 Foster id gives the following examples. ‘A. adviseth B. to Rob C, He doth Rob him, and in so doing, either upon 
Resistance made, or to conceal the Fact, or upon any other Motive operating at the Time of the Robbery, Killeth 
him. A. is Accessary to this Murder.’  In the context of oblique intention, Foster provides this example, ‘A. 
soliciteth B. to Burn the House of C, He doth it; and the Flames taking hold of the House of D. that likewise is 
Burnt. A. is Accessary to the Burning of this Latter House.’ 
41 Baker, note 24, 226; 232-239. 
42 [1762] Fost. 353. 
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crime and it like Lord Dacre’s Case43 and the later poaching cases from 1800s 
onwards,44 which are accepted as authoritative in R v Jogee, develop and set the fault 
element for complicity.   
The majority in Miller v The Queen45 also misquote Stephen by giving a 
selection of quotes from Stephen out of context and in isolation from his views on 
joint enterprise. If they had quoted the Article immediately below the one they quote 
from Stephen’s Digest, the entire meaning of what Stephen was stating in that Article 
would have been apparent. Stephen in his own books did not adopt an objective fault 
element for complicity.46 The quotations referred to in Miller v The Queen were 
discussing accessorial liability in cases where the perpetrator was constructively liable 
for an untended consequence of an intended act. Beyond that, the quotations referred 
to simply reiterate the statement of the law from Foster, which was that it was no 
defence to accessorial murder that the perpetrator used different means from what the 
accessory intended her to use. Foster, on the very next page, continues his analysis 
with reference to transferred malice and the famous case of Archer and Saunders.47 
Stephen’s views about joint enterprise liability are not in the passages quoted by the 
High Court. Rather Stephen also quotes the Three Soldiers case and R v Plummer48 
under a different Article in his Digest concerning common purpose fact scenarios.49  
No more space will be dedicated to this issue, because the majority in R v 
Jogee has held, that even if the objective test was ever a part of the common law, it 
																																																								
43 [1535] 72 ER 458. 
44 For an analysis an application of the poaching cases in Australian law, see Baker, note 24, 220. See also R v 
Dunn [1930] 30 SR (NSW) 210, 214.  
45 [2016] HCA 30 at paras 13-16.  
46 Baker, above note 24, 235.  
47 [1762] Fost. 371. 
48 [1706] 84 ER 1103. 
49 See Baker, above note 24, 235-236.  
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has not been so for more than 300 years. Consequently, it is hard to see how it has any 
relevance on the current law. Gageler J (dissenting in Miller v The Queen) got the gist 
of this when he stated,50 ‘the common law for a long time treated intention as a matter 
for objective determination: a party was taken to intend a probable consequence of an 
act which that party did or to which that party agreed. Early commentaries on criminal 
liability at common law, particularly those of Sir Michael Foster in the middle of the 
eighteenth century and Sir James Stephen in the second half of the nineteenth century, 
need to be read cautiously in that light.’ 
It was submitted above that R v Jogee holds that, 1) foresight of possible 
collateral crimes was used as evidence of intention including conditional intention in 
the joint enterprise cases; 2) that there isn’t any independent doctrine of joint 
enterprise, because all complicity has the same conduct element under section 8 of the 
Accessories and Abettors Act 1861. The conduct element involves an act of aid, 
abetment, counselling or procurement. In modern terminology these categories have 
been reduced to two categories of acts, which are acts of assistance or acts of 
encouragement. Procurement is a third category, but it only applies in the unusual 
innocent agency cases.51    
The decision in Miller v The Queen 52  does not accept either of these 
propositions. It holds that fault can be established in complicity cases if the 
accessory’s state of mind involved either intentional (association) 
assistance/encouragement or recklessness (association) assistance/encouragement. 
																																																								
50 [2016] HCA 30, para 87.  
51 Matusevich v The Queen [1977] 137 CLR 633, 637. See also D Lanham, ‘Conspiracy, Complicity and Concert’, 
(1980) 4 Crim LJ 276, 278-279.    
52 [2016] HCA 30. 
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The most controversial theory invoked in Miller v The Queen53 to justify a doctrine of 
extended joint enterprise is Professor Simester’s ‘change of normative position’ 
theory as presented in a 2006 paper.54  According to such explanations of the change 
of normative position theory, a participant, who voluntarily and intentionally joined a 
criminal enterprise, had changed his normative position and therefore should be made 
fully liable for any collateral crime he foresaw as a possibility.  But such an 
explanation overlooks the fact that in an individual perpetration liability situation like 
assault occasioning actual bodily harm it is the defendant’s own act which results in 
the unintended harm but in collateral joint enterprise liability it is another autonomous 
and independent human being’s act that results in the unintended harm proscribed in 
the collateral crime.  A person who assaults his victim and then causes unintended 
harm has control, at least, over his own conduct which has caused the unintended 
harm. But a participant in an extended joint criminal enterprise case has no control 
over the conduct, which has caused the unintended harm because that conduct is the 
independent and autonomous choice of the perpetrator. The change of normative 
position theory faces strong challenges in trying to justify constructive liability in the 
context of perpetration.  In the first place, it is implicit what kind of normative 
position it is to be changed by committing a crime. In the second place, it is 
unequivocal how the position is changed. Some scholars observe that it is the 
intentionality that changes the normative position.55 However, based on the notion of 
intentionality it encounters problems in applying to impulsive conduct or acts done in 
																																																								
53 [2016] HCA 30, para 33, ‘The alternative view, proposed by Professor Simester, is that joint criminal enterprise 
is a sui generis form of secondary participation in a crime and not merely a sub-species of accessorial liability’. 
54 A P Simester, ‘The Mental Element in Complicity’, [2006] 122 L Q R 578, 598-99.   
55 A Ashworth, ‘A Change of Normative Position: Determining the Contours of Culpability in Criminal Law’ 
(2008) 11(2) New Criminal Law Review 232, at 243. J Horder, ‘A Critique of the Correspondence Principle in 
Criminal Law' (1995)  Crim. L.R . 759, at 764.  
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temper.56 Even if we omit its inapplicability in such cases, we still see vagueness in 
interpreting how the normative position has been changed. Because an intention to 
commit a crime does not indicate an intention to bring any harm of any description. 
There is a big moral difference between a person taking the consequences of her own 
personal acts and taking the consequences of the autonomous and independent 
conduct of another.57  As I have just argued in the above paragraphs, change of 
normative position theory cannot provide a convincing justification for constructive 
liability in the context of perpetration liability; we can hardly see it can do this job in 
the context of extended joint criminal enterprise liability where D will be held liable 
for the conduct of the independent and autonomous perpetrator, over which D has no 
control at all.  
Professor Gardner, the original author of the ‘change of normative position’ 
theory, has not only abandoned his original assertions58 on change of normative 
position theory but also repudiated any suggestion that his aim was to present a 
positive justification for constructive liability. Gardner writes:  
 
‘I suggested a possible way of thinking about constructive crimes. I said that by 
committing the lesser crime one “changes one’s normative position” such that a 
certain outcome that would not otherwise have counted now counts against one, and 
adds to one’s crime. …. I regret that my remark about “changing one’s normative 
position” was taken … to be an attempt at offering a “substantive moral justification 
for any constructive liability. I only meant to analyse the law’s own moral outlook. I 
meant … to set out the thing that needs to be justified rather than the justification.’59    
 																																																								
56 Ibid, Ashworth, at 244. 
57 See Baker, above n. 5, at 82.  
58 Gardner did not develop a justification for the claim and was not aiming to do so.  
59 Gardner, above note 15, 246-247.  
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Simester, among others,60 have seized Gardner’s analysis of the law’s moral 
outlook concerning constructive liability as a substantive justification for not only 
permitting constructive liability, but also for dispensing with the conduct element in 
complicity which should be either assistance or encouragement. The only check it 
puts on liability by mere association is foresight. Hence, association plus foresight is 
sufficient to convict a person of murder in Australia. 61  These scholars have 
misunderstood Gardner and have put forward a vacuous assertion as a positive 
justification for the extended joint enterprise doctrine. It is submitted that the 
arguments by Baker and also more generally by Gardner62 and Ashworth,63 are far 
more convincing. It is difficult to see how the normative position explanation can 
provide a substantive justification for the unjust form of criminalisation that ‘the 
extended doctrine of joint enterprise liability’ permits.  
What the High Court of Australia has not done is provide a precedential 
justification let alone a positive normative justification for its decision to extend the 
criminal law. Specifically, it has not provided a justification that is supported by the 
common law precedents nor by any other principles of justice. In the older Australia 
authorities there isn’t any precedent that replaces the assistance and encouragement 
requirement for complicity liability with a conduct element that requires nothing more 
than association. 64  These same authorities also support interpreting the mental 
																																																								
60 J Horder and D Hughes, ‘Joint Criminal Ventures and Murder: The Prospects for Law Reform’, (2009) 20 
King’s L J 379, 398. 
61 It has been suggested that joint enterprise liability ‘allows a form of “guilt by association” or “guilt by simple 
presence without more”. Nothing in McAuliffe supports either conclusion. … the secondary party must continue to 
participate in the agreed criminal enterprise.’ (Emphasis added) Miller v The Queen [2016] HCA 30, para 45. 
62 Gardner, above note 15, 246-247.  
63 Ashworth, above note 55. 
64 Baker, above note 24 at 218 citing R v Johns [1978] 1 NSWLR 282, 285-86; R v Dunn [1930] 30 SR (NSW) 
210, 214 R v Dorrey [1970] 3 NSWLR 351, 353; R v Adams [1932] VLR 222, 223-24; R v Kalinowski [1930] 31 
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element in complicity as limiting liability to intentional assistance and 
encouragement.65 The High Court of Australia has invoked the change of normative 
position theory to defend a doctrine of extended joint enterprise that it acknowledges 
was created by judicial fiat in 199566, consequently, it should have developed a 
positive justification to show the validity and justice of adopting this approach.  
Finally, it is submitted that the interpretative methodology adopted by the 
High Court of Australia in Miller v The Queen was unorthodox. In the 21st century it 
is unexpected that Supreme Court decisions from the United Kingdom and from the 
United States, drawing on centuries of common law precedents, haven’t any 
persuasive influence. The appeal was from the common law jurisdiction of South 
Australia.67 South Australia is a common law jurisdiction where until relatively recent 
times (1986) an appeal could be made to the Privy Council.68 When appeals were 
made to the Privy Council the Board of the Council drew on the English common law 
authorities to resolve legal issues. It is recognised that, there have been no appeals to 
the Privy Council from Australia since 1980 and the expense of appealing to London 
was such a deterrent that there hasn’t been any criminal law appeal since the 1964 
appeal in Parker v The Queen.69   
																																																																																																																																																														
SR (NSW) 377, 380-81; R v Dowdle [1901] 26 VLR 637, 639-41; R v Surridge [1942] 42 SR (NSW) 278, 282-83; 
R v Grand [1903] 3 SR (NSW) 216, 218.   
65 See Baker, above note 3, ch. 2.  
66 McAuliffe v The Queen [1995] 183 CLR 108. 
67 A Hemming, ‘In Search of a Model Code Provision for Complicity and Common Purpose in Australia’, (2011) 
30 U Tas L Rev 53; K J Arenson, M Bagaric & P Gillies, Australian Criminal Laws in the Common Law 
Jurisdictions: Cases and Materials (Melbourne: OUP, 2011). 
68 The Privy Council (Appeals from the High Court) Act 1975 (Cth) abolished the right to appeal from the High 
Court to the Privy Council in all matters of state jurisdiction. But it remained possible for appellants to choose 
between appealing to the High Court or the Privy Council on state matters until 1986. Australia Act 1986 (U.K. 
and Cth.) 
69 [1964] 111 C.L.R. 665. 
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Nevertheless, Parker v The Queen uses the common law method of drawing 
on English precedents to contextualise and historicizes the law as a part of the 
interpretive approach. In that case the Privy Council drew on ancient English 
authorities to build a narrative for interpreting the law within the common law context 
in which it evolved.  Moreover, in this paper it has been submitted that many 
watertight authorities 70  from Australia’s common law jurisdictions convincingly 
underwrite the reasoning adopted by the majority in R v Jogee71 and Ruddock v The 
Queen.72 The same precedents convincingly undermine the majority decision of the 
High Court of Australia in Miller v The Queen. 
The policy arguments given by the High Court to defend its decision not to 
reinterpret the law so that it can be reconciled with centuries of common law 
authorities and contemporary standards of justice shows that the Court misunderstood 
its role. It is not a legislature and therefore its role is not to look at the wider policy 
arguments that might justify legislative reform.  Rather its job is to interpret the 
specific legal doctrines before it by drawing on precedents. For an example of one of 
its wide policy justifications, the court stated, ‘Importantly, in Clayton it was said that 
no change should be undertaken to the law of extended joint criminal enterprise 
without examining the whole of the law with respect to secondary liability for crime. 
As was observed, it would be undesirable to alter the doctrine as it applies to the law 
of homicide, which is its principal area of application, without consideration of 
whether the common law of murder should be amended to distinguish between killing 
																																																								
70 R v Dunn [1930] 30 SR (NSW) 210, 214 R v Dorrey [1970] 3 NSWLR 351, 353; R v Adams [1932] VLR 222, 
223-24; R v Kalinowski [1930] 31 SR (NSW) 377, 380-81; R v Dowdle [1901] 26 VLR 637, 639-41; R v Surridge 
[1942] 42 SR (NSW) 278, 282-83; R v Grand [1903] 3 SR (NSW) 216, 218.   
71 [2016] UKSC 8. 
72 [2016] UKPC 7. 
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with intent to kill and killing with intent to cause really serious injury.’73 This 
statement is followed by three more paragraphs stating that the entire law would have 
to be considered and that changes in the law should not be made without reforming 
the entire law of complicity. It refers to the sorts of policy and big picture arguments 
that are in the remit of law commissions and parliaments. Some of the other policy 
‘assertions’ stated in Miller v The Queen for not overruling McAuliffe v The Queen 
included, 1) it would cause great inconvenience since many wrongly convicted parties 
might appeal; 2) there wasn’t any substantive injustice in the current law.74 These 
sorts of wider policy considerations are not the business of the courts. ‘Judges ought 
to remember that their office is Ius dicere, and not Ius dare; to interpret law, and not 
to make or give law.’75 
The High Court of Australia was not bound to follow the Supreme Court and 
Privy Council decision in R v Jogee and Ruddock v The Queen, but that decision 
should have been much more persuasive than it was, taking into account the 
compelling academic research on the point and, taking into account that the Supreme 
Court of the United States recently held that the early English authorities mandated 
that the mens rea for complicity liability is intention.76 It is also incongruous that it 
instead decided to apply the decision in R v Powell that was overruled for being an 
erroneous decision.77 Not only did the High Court of Australia pay no attention to the 
common law as it existed before Chan Wing-Siu v The Queen, it also relied on a very 
narrow selection of academic works and terse case commentaries. Perhaps the most 																																																								
73 Miller v The Queen [2016] HCA 30, para 40. 
74 ‘The submissions are in abstract form and do not identify decided cases in which it can be seen that extended 
joint criminal enterprise liability has occasioned injustice.’ Miller v The Queen [2016] HCA 30, 39.  
75 Francis Bacon, Essays, Moral, Economical, and Political (London: T. Bensley, 1798), 198. 
76 Rosemond v U.S.  [2014] 134 S.Ct. 1240. 
77 ‘Moreover, most of the arguments in favour of change had been thoroughly considered and rejected by the 
House of Lords in Powell.’ Miller v The Queen [2016] HCA 30, para 40. 
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controversial argument invoked was Simester’s ‘change of normative position’ 
theory. Keane J also was in the majority but gave a separate judgment. The 
controversial and flawed reasoning of Keane J will be discussed in the next section of 
this paper.  
III Perpetration vs. Assisting/Encouraging and the Double 
Constructive Nature of Extended Joint Enterprise Doctrine 
 
In Miller v The Queen Keane J starts his judgment by suggesting that intention is 
required for standard complicity and that ‘the criminal responsibility of a participant 
in a joint criminal enterprise is grounded in the authorisation of a crime which is 
incidental to the enterprise.’78 Keane J does not explain how one can recklessly 
authorise. One cannot accidentally, negligently or recklessly authorise, even if one 
can negligently or recklessly send a message of encouragement. Authorisation has to 
be intentional. If you authorise something then the concept of ‘authorise’ suggests a 
desire or purpose that it happen.79 Authorise is to approve or permit—it suggests that 
D gives his permission—which D cannot do accidentally or recklessly, since that 
would not be any permission at all. It would be a putative permission based on P’s 
mistaken belief that D is genuinely authorising or permitting. Keane J then asserts that 
Australian law recognises criminal liability should be proportionate to individual 
culpability, but that this can be achieved by making a person who recklessly 
associates with a murderer liable for a murder perpetrated by that murderer. Keane J 
asserts, 
																																																								
78 Miller v The Queen [2016] HCA 30. 
79 Baker, above note 3.  
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‘In particular, where two or more persons agree to commit a crime together knowing 
that its execution includes the risk of the commission of another crime in the course 
of its execution, there is no obvious reason, in terms of individual moral culpability, 
why the person who commits the actus reus should bear primary criminal 
responsibility, as between himself or herself and the other participants to the joint 
criminal enterprise, for the incidental crime. Because of the fact of the agreement to 
carry out jointly the criminal enterprise, the person who commits the actus reus of 
the incidental crime is necessarily acting as the instrument of the other participants to 
deal with the foreseen exigencies of carrying their enterprise into effect.’80 
 
            Keane J then goes not to expound some sort of agency theory: 
 
‘Where parties commit to a joint criminal enterprise, each participant becomes, by 
reason of that commitment, both the principal and the agent of the other participants: 
for the purposes of that enterprise they are partners in crime. Each participant also 
necessarily authorises those acts which he or she foresees as possible incidents of 
carrying out the enterprise in which he or she has agreed, and continues, to 
participate.’81 
 
It seems that Keane J was confounded about the difference between moral 
culpability and legal culpability and also the difference between perpetration and 
assistance/encouragement. His Honour also seems to conflate joint perpetration with 
assistance/encouragement.82 Moreover, there seems to be a misunderstanding about 
																																																								
80 Miller v The Queen [2016] HCA 30, para 138.   
81 Miller v The Queen [2016] HCA 30, para 139.  
82 Baker, above note 12.   
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the difference between innocent agency and perpetration.83 Those who participate in 
criminal joint enterprises are not mere instruments in the hands of each other—they 
are not innocent agents but fully autonomous wrongdoers.  They are self-governing 
and self-determining agents. Liberal states do not adhere to the notion of collective 
agency. 84 The reference to organised crime is also unhelpful as it involves many 
conceptual aspects and distinctions that make it very different from standard 
complicity. Most jurisdictions have enacted special provisions to tackle organized 
crime85 and it is unhelpful for it to be discussed in the context of complicity; such a 
discussion is not relevant or helpful for interpreting the law of complicity, because it 
is a conceptually distinct form of wrongdoing.   
By and large joint enterprises do not involve organised crime, but usually 
involve a couple of criminals engaging in a robbery or some other lawful activity. 
There are a couple of high profile cases involving gangs of youths where an 
escalation of violence has resulted in a murder by one of the gang, but such cases are 
not the norm. See the earlier High Court case of Miller v The Queen86 where there 
was no unlawful joint enterprise and where there were only two parties involved. In 
that case D drove P to locations so he could have sexual relations with prostitutes. 
The locations were places such as parks. P started to kill the prostitutes and D with 
this knowledge continued to assist him by driving him to the locations. D knew that P 
had started to randomly kill some of the women, but continued to help. P was hardly 
																																																								
83 His Honour relies on agency or vicarious liability theory which and fails to see how it differs from complicity 
liability.  In particular, see Keane J’s discussion at para 140-141.   
84 G P Fletcher, ‘Collective Guilt and Collective Punishment,’ (2004) 5 Theoretical Inquiries in Law 163; J 
McMahan, ‘Collective Crime and Collective Punishment,’ (2008) 27 Crim J Ethics 4.  
85 Anna Sergi, ‘Organised Crime in Criminal Law: Conspiracy and Membership Offences in Italian, English and 
International Frameworks,’ (2014) 25 King’s L J 185; Liz Campbell, “The Offence of Participating in Activities of 
Organised Crime Group: Section 45 of the Serious Crime Act 2015 ”(2015) 10 Archbold Review 6.   
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an instrument of D. Nor was D a joint perpetrator. The enterprise was lawful since it 
involved consensual sexual relations between two adults.  P did not intend to kill on 
many occasions, but merely intended to have consensual sex. It could be inferred that 
D conditionally intended to assist P to kill whenever the compulsion struck P, since D 
had full knowledge of what was taking place but chose to continue to assist.87 To 
argue that P was merely D’s instrument in such case is erroneous.  
What makes an accessory equally liable as a principal is a deeming provision 
that deems that the perpetrator intended to kill (or perpetrate whatever the crime was 
committed) using his own hands while the accessory did not personally intend to kill 
and did not in fact personally do an action that killed, but merely intended that the 
perpetrator intentionally kill (or in Australia was reckless as to whether the 
perpetrator might kill) and, intentionally assisted or encouraged the perpetrator.  The 
law deems that he intended to kill and deems that he killed with his own hands; it is 
on that fiction that he is held equally liable for the crime perpetrated by the actual 
perpetrator. These deeming provisions are based on a legal fiction that D personally 
killed and personally intended to kill, when that is not the case. Furthermore, Keane J 
seems to assert that there is no moral distinction should be drawn between the parties 
to a crime. For Keane J, they should all be deemed principals at all stages of the 
inquiry. The English Parliament has been more progressive in this sense, because in 
2007 it enacted the Serious Crime Act 2007, which criminalises 
assistance/encouragement as a lesser independent offence. Notwithstanding that, 
Keane J’s assertion is flawed even under the law of complicity, since complicity has 
its own mental element and conduct element. Coupled with that, it will be submitted 
																																																								
87 See further Baker, above note 24.  
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below there is a great normative difference between the wrong of perpetrating and the 
wrong of assisting/encouraging.  
         A person who assists or encourages the commission of a crime is an 
assister/encourager of that the crime, not a perpetrator of that crime.  Why is 
participation (assistance or encouragement) different from perpetration? The core 
difference between participation and perpetration is that the latter causes the 
prohibited criminal harm while the former merely contributes to the prohibited harm 
by assisting or encouraging the independent and autonomous perpetrator. The 
accessory is one step removed from the prohibited harm, and the perpetrator’s free, 
deliberate and autonomous perpetration has broken any chain of causation between 
the accessory and the prohibited harm. The canonical statement of the difference 
between perpetration and participation is provided by Professor Glanville Williams.  
Williams states:88 
 
‘The novus actus doctrine is at the root of the law of complicity….Principals cause, 
accomplices encourage (or otherwise influence) or help. If the instigator were 
regarded as causing the result he would be a principal, and the conceptual division 
between principals (or as I prefer to call them, perpetrators) and accomplices would 
vanish. Indeed, it was because the instigator was not regarded as causing the crime 
that the notion of accessories had to be developed. This is the irrefragable argument 
for recognising the novus actus principle as one of the bases of our criminal law.’  
 
 
            The House of Lords in the leading case R v Kennedy (No.2) held that:89 
 																																																								
88 Williams, above note 10, 398.  
89 R v Kennedy (No.2) [2008]1 A.C. 269, at 275.  
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‘The criminal law generally assumes the existence of free will.…But, generally 
speaking, informed adults of sound mind are treated as autonomous beings able to 
make their own decisions how they will act,… Thus D is not to be treated as causing 
V to act in a certain way if V makes a voluntary and informed decision to act in that 
way rather than another.’ 
 
            Hart and Honoré90 also came to a similar conclusion in their famous treatise 
on causation. The rule that free, voluntary and informed human actions can break the 
chain of causation has been confirmed as a principle that is “fundamental and not 
controversial”.91  In the context of complicity the perpetrator and only the perpetrator 
directly causes the end criminal harm; he causes it directly through his personal 
actions. Moreover, the free, informed and autonomous action theory deals with fully 
culpable agents; it isolates them from the special case of innocent agents. The 
assister’s (or encourager’s) action is in the background and has no direct influence on 
the end criminal harm—the criminal harm is contingent on the perpetrator’s choice to 
use the assistance supplied or to listen to the encouragement that is proffered. D 
supplies P with bullets and P puts these in his gun and uses these particular bullets to 
kill V. D has caused P to be assisted, but D has not caused P to load the gun and kill 
V. P has caused himself to be armed and caused himself to aim at the human target 
and pull the trigger.92 P was not insane, under duress or deception and therefore made 
a fully informed and autonomous choice to kill another human being.   
																																																								
90 Hart and Honoré wrote: ‘The free, deliberate and informed intervention of a second person, who intends to 
exploit the situation created by the first, but is not acting in concert with him, is normally held to relieve the first 
actor of criminal responsibility’. H L A Hart and T Honoré, Causation in the Law (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2002), 326.  
91 R v Kennedy (No.2) [2008]1 AC 269, 276; R v Gnango [2012] 1 AC 827, 867.  
92 Baker, above note 12, 260-261. 
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           According to Gardner, ‘there is no way of contributing to any result, directly or 
indirectly, except causally. That is the only kind of contribution to results that exists, 
and since the only kind of complicity is complicity by contribution to results, 
complicity is always a kind of causal wrong.’93  Gardner argues that accessories cause 
through the conduct of the perpetrator but what Gardner seems to call indirect 
causation cannot really be conceptualised as causation. People who have argued that 
accessories can “cause” use a word “in a special or technical sense that need not 
conform to our ordinary use of the word, while still trading on what we normally 
mean by it.”94 Causation, as used by Gardner in analysing complicity liability, is not 
the central type of causal relationship we refer to in perpetration liability; instead, it is 
understood in a more tenuous sense.95 Moore also argues that an intervening act does 
not break the chain of causation in fact but it is construed to be so because some 
reasons of legal policy make it justified that an intervening act does break the chain of 
causation. 96 Sullivan holds very similar viewpoint to that of Moore.97  But this 
argument is unconvincing and indefensible as long as perpetration liability is still the 
core of criminal liability. It has long been recognised that one’s conduct is deemed to 
be an autonomous and free choice if it is not done under deception or coercion.98 Free, 
voluntary human actions cannot be caused, even if it could be said in a sense as 
heavily influenced by another,99 because human beings are total sovereign over their 
																																																								
93 Gardner, above note 8, 443. 
94 Daniel Yeager, "Helping, Doing, and the Grammar of Complicity" (1996) 15(1) Criminal Justice Ethics 25, 29.  
95 Hart and Honoré, above note 103, at 43.  
96 See Michael S. Moore, Causation and Responsibility (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010) at 291-292.  
97 Sullivan, above note 16, at 221.  
98 R v Latif [1996] 2 Cr. App R. 92; R v Kennedy (No. 2) [2008] 1 A.C. 269; R v Gnango [2012] 1 A.C. 827.  
99  Glanville Williams, ‘Finis for Novus Actus? [1989] Cambridge L.J. 391, at 392.  
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own actions and human actions therefore are treated differently from natural 
events.100  
            If we accept that causation covers both but-for cause and legal cause, then we 
have to admit that the one who has caused the prohibited harm is, in fact, the 
perpetrator. Assistance/encouragement in many cases will not be the but-for cause of 
the prohibited harm in the target crime,101 let along the legal cause of that harm. 
Because in many case, the perpetrator would commit the target crime anyway even if 
he did not get assistance/encouragement from that accessory. In some cases, the 
assistance/encouragement is essential and indispensable, for example, the brilliant 
scientist D purposely provides P with the means to blow up the city of Los Angeles, 
which outcome would have been well beyond P’s or any ordinary person’s expertise 
or capacity but for D’s assistance.102 It is plausible to say that in such a case, but for 
the accessory’s help the perpetrator would not have committed the crime as he did. 
However, it would be problematic to say that D’s assistance is legal cause of the 
eventual harm, because P’s bombing the city is a free, voluntary and informed human 
intervention and can therefore break the chain of causation between D’s facilitation 
and the resulting death. 
If the above arguments are accepted we can see that there is a normative 
difference between assisting/encouraging and perpetration. Perpetration (depending 
on the crime) almost always involves direct criminal harm-doing. In a case of murder 
it involves the victim’s life being deprived. In a case of rape it involves a victim’s 
sexual autonomy being violated. In a case of robbery it involves a victim suffering 
injury and losing property. However, assisting/encouraging almost never involves any 																																																								
100 Kadish, above note 8, at 330.  
101 Ibid, 360.  
102 Joshua Dressler, "Reforming Complicity Law: Trivial Assistance as a Lesser Offence?" (2008) 5(2) Ohio State 
Journal of Criminal Law 427, at 440.  
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direct criminal harm-doing. It is not impossible to think of examples where the 
encouragement or assistance is criminal in itself, 103  but in most cases the 
encouragement/assistance is not harmful or criminal. The harmfulness of 
assisting/encouraging is contingent on P’s independent and autonomous choice to use 
that assistance/encouragement to perpetrate a crime.  
D’s encouragement or assistance, even when substantial and culpable, is less 
dangerous than perpetration, because it is contingent on another person being willing 
to follow through. No empirical study has ever been conducted on cases of inchoate 
assistance and encouragement, but one would suspect there are many cases where 
assistance or encouragement is given without P acting on it. If this can be proven 
empirically, then that would be evidence of the fact that harmless conduct (remote 
harms) that are only harmful by slightly increasing the risk of a perpetrator’s success 
are less dangerous and wrongful than acts of direct perpetration.    
What buttresses the above thesis is the remote harms theory as sketched 
above. There are several kinds of situations involving remote harms such as abstract 
endangerment, intervening choices and accumulative harms. 104 For present purposes 
the focus is on the second category of remote harm where the harm occurs when 
another person’s innocuous conduct becomes remotely harmful because it helps 
another or encourages another to commit a harmful crime.  The crux of the matter is 
that the accessory’s participation is a remote harm in that its harmfulness and 
																																																								
103 For example, a rapist is encouraged to rape in a gang-rape situation because he sees his fellow gang members 
first raping the victim. Technically, each gang rapist could be liable for multiple counts of rape including his own 
personal act of rape. Illegal assistance might be result from running a pirate website such as Putlocker to facilitate 
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treated as such.  
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A T H Smith (eds), Harm and Culpability (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996); See D J Baker, ‘The Moral Limits of 
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wrongfulness is contingent on the perpetrator making an independent choice to 
commit the target crime. The harmfulness of perpetration is certain because it initiates 
the prohibited harm; the harmfulness of participation is not certain in itself, it is 
contingent on the perpetrator’s choice. Therefore, participation is less harmful than 
perpetration. 
Another aspect of this is that remote contributions are far less dangerous than 
direct contributions. As moral agents, we have the capacity to choose to violate the 
law or not.105 The perpetrator is made fully liable because he unjustifiably and 
inexcusably chose to kill the victim or chose some other criminal harm. The 
perpetrator is more dangerous not only because he has the will to kill whereas the 
assister/encourager only has the nerve and will to assist/encourage, but also because 
the perpetrator has direct control over the end harm. It is the perpetrator who controls 
and decides whether the end harm will be brought about, not the remote harmer 
(assister/encourager). Accessories have no control over whether their assistance will 
be used or whether their encouragement will be adhered to, unless they use duress or 
fraud and would then be directly liable through the innocent or semi-innocent agent 
doctrines.106 The accessory leaves the act of killing etc. in the hands of another 
autonomous agent he is one step removed from the direct control that is required to 
bring about the harmful crime. The accessories leave it all to chance. Accessories 
have only increased the risk that the target crime might be committed by providing 																																																								
105 See L Alexander et al, Crime and Culpability: A Theory of Criminal Law (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2011), 196.  
106 Even these sorts of innocent agency cases can be dealt with through an independent offence. Section 44 of the 
Serious Crime Act 2007 (U.K.) holds, ‘(1) A person commits an offence if—(a) he does an act capable of 
encouraging or assisting the commission of an offence; and (b) he intends to encourage or assist its commission. 
(2) But he is not to be taken to have intended to encourage or assist the commission of an offence merely because 
such encouragement or assistance was a foreseeable consequence of his act.’ Section 47 of that same Act holds, ‘In 
proving for the purposes of this section whether an act is one which, if done, would amount to the commission of 
an offence—(a) (iii) D’s state of mind was such that, were he to do it, it would be done with that fault…’ 
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assistance or encouragement. The end result is fully dependent on the perpetrator and 
what he decides to do when the moment for perpetration comes.   
People have control over their choices and therefore are subject to liability and 
punishment for the harms they choose to produce.107 A person should not be made 
fully liable for what he cannot control. 108  We should be very hesitant to punish a 
person for conduct that is not within her control. What is in the control of the 
accessory is his act of assisting or encouraging and he should be punished for that 
wrongdoing only. Furthermore, the assister or encourager is a person who does not 
have the fortitude or resolve to perpetrate the actus reus of the crime himself—this 
kind of person is not as dangerous as a person who has the fortitude and resolve to 
directly perpetrate crimes. Such a person might be one who could never kill if he had 
to use his own hands to do the dirty work. If not, and he kills, then he should be 
punished for his personal wrongdoing as a murderer. While he remains a remote 
assister/encourager there is no case for deeming him a murderer. 
Treating an assister/encourager fully liable in the same way as the perpetrator 
for the crime assisted/encouraged goes against the principles of fair labelling109  and 
proportionate punishment.110 A person who has assisted rape is not a rapist because he 
does not do the penetration and assisting rape is removed one step away from the 
penetration. Therefore, punishing an assister in rape the same as the rapist does not 																																																								
107 See D N Husak, The Philosophy of Criminal Law: Selected Essays (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 
34; Michael S. Moore, Placing Blame: A Theory of the Criminal Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 
211-218.  
108 See R A Duff, 'Who is Responsible, for What, to Whom?', (2005) 2 Ohio St J of Crim L 441, 452-454.  
109 B Mitchell, "Multiple Wrongdoing and Offence Structure: A Plea for Consistency and Fair Labelling" (2001) 
64(3) Modern Law Review 393 129, 398. 
110 A von Hirsch, Censure and Sanctions (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), at 29; Douglas Husak, "Desert, 
Proportionality, and the Seriousness of Drug Offences" in A Ashworth and M Wasik (eds), Fundamental of 
Sentencing Theory: Essays in Honour of Andrew Von Hirsch (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), at 189; A von 
Hirsch and A Ashworth, Proportionate Sentencing: Exploring the Principles (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2005) 131-132; A Von Hirsch, "Proportionality in the Philosophy of Punishment" (1992) 16 Crime & Just. 55. 
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reflect the nature and degree of the assister’s wrongdoing. The unfairness and 
injustice of complicity liability is doubled in the context of extended joint enterprise 
liability where a person neither perpetrated the collateral crime nor 
assisted/encouraged the commission of the collateral crime. The full criminal liability 
for the collateral crime is based on a legal fiction that by participating in the 
underlying crime he has provided assistance/encouragement to the collateral crime 
automatically. The defendant’s participating in the underlying crime is regarded as 
assisting/encouraging of the collateral crime and this fictitiously constructed 
assisting/encouraging in the collateral crime will be further constructed as sufficient 
actus reus of the collateral crime. Moreover, the defendant’s mere foresight that the 
collateral crime might be committed is constructed as an intention to assist/encourage 
knowing all the essential matters of the collateral crime, and this fictitiously 
constructed mens rea will be further constructed as the required mens rea for the 
collateral crime.  Consequently, the double constructive nature of extended joint 
enterprise liability make a person fully liable for a crime while his wrongdoing is 
much less harmful and his mens rea is much less culpable.  
Retributive justice as well as utilitarianism requires that the crime label and 
punishment should reflect the defendant’s past harm-doing and personal 
culpability.111 From the abovementioned analyses we can see that the wrongdoing in 
assisting and encouraging is less than that in perpetrating; and therefore even if 
culpability for assisting/encouraging and perpetrating is not substantially apart (for 
instance both D and P intend V should be killed), the crime label and punishment 
should still be less for assisting or encouraging.  
																																																								
111 See Generally, D N Husak, ‘Retribution in Criminal Theory,’ (2000) 37(4) San Diego L R 959; M Tonry, 
Retrubutivism Has a Past: Has It a Future? (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011). 
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In the context of extended joint enterprise, the defendant’s full liability for the 
collateral crime is based on two layers of fictitious assumption. Firstly, it is 
fictitiously held that by participating in the underlying crime, the defendant is giving 
assistance/encouragement to the commission of the collateral crime and that the 
defendant’s foresight of the collateral crime is constructed as an intention to 
assist/encourage the collateral crime knowing all the essential matters of the collateral 
crime. Secondly, the defendant’s fictitiously constructed assistance/encouragement in 
the commission of the collateral crime is further constructed as sufficient actus reus 
for the collateral crime and the defendant’s fictitiously constructed mens rea for 
assisting/encouraging the collateral crime is further deemed as sufficient mens rea of 
the collateral crime.  Assisting/encouraging a crime is less harmful than perpetrating 
the crime, and risking another’s commission of a crime is less than 
assisting/encouraging the commission of that crime; therefore, risking another’s 
offending is far less than perpetrating that offence. The unfairness and injustice of 
complicity liability is doubled in the context of extended joint enterprise liability. 
Such harsh and unjust law should be abolished in our 21st century.   
IV The Unconvincing Policy Considerations in Justifying the 
Doctrine of Extended Joint Enterprise  
 
Keane J also gives his own conservative policy reasons for not adopting the legal 
interpretation of the law as presented by the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom, 
where the law was interpreted by drawing on the precedents, not by drawing on 
conservative policy opinions that are not underwritten with solid empirical research. 
The lack of empirical research to support the bold policy claims is just one reason 
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why the particular policy justifications should not have been invoked to interpret the 
law. In extreme cases policy might compel a court to reduce the scope of the criminal 
law, but it can never give a court permission to extend the criminal law. It is an 
ancient common law principle that doubtful law be interpreted in favour of the 
defendant. Moreover, neither precedent nor policy empowers a court to create new 
common law doctrines of criminal liability.112   
           The majority judgment has adopted the policy considerations in R v Powell and 
English 113 asserting that the goal of crime control provides good reasons for 
maintaining the doctrine of extended joint enterprise because it would be well nigh 
impossible in the majority of joint enterprise cases to prove D’s sufficient intention 
for murder; and that experiences show that joint enterprises too readily escalate into 
more serious crimes and for the purpose of dealing with this social problem the 
extended joint enterprise doctrine should not be abolished. 114  However, the 
deterrence function is not as effective as the court has alleged. Adopting extended 
joint enterprise doctrine which allows for double constructive liability produces 
extreme injustice and unfairness as a person would be labelled and punished in the 
same way as the perpetrator when his wrongdoing should be labelled and punished as 
a distinct crime. Such a person would not be deterred from killing, because he has not 
killed.115 Leading professors like Posner116 and Shavell117 have argued that without 
																																																								
112 R v Rimmington [2006] 1 AC 459. Baker, above note 30, paras 1-019; 1-025 notes that it is an ‘ancient principle 
that in case of doubt a criminal statute is to be “strictly construed” in favour of the defendant.’  
113 R v Powell and English [1999] 1 AC 1. 
114 Miller v The Queen [2016] HCA 30, at paras 36 and 146.  
115 See See Paul H. Robinson, Distributive Principles of Criminal Law: Who Should be Punished How Much (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2008), at chap. 8.   
116 Richard A. Posner, "An Economic Theory of the Criminal Law" (1985) 85(6) Columbia Law Review 1193, at 
1220.  
117 Steven Shavell, "Criminal Law and the Optimal Use of Nonmonetary Sanctions as a Deterrent" (1985) 85(6) 
Columbia Law Review 1232, at 1256-1257. 
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any deterrent benefit, punishment is pointless.  Punishing a participant in a joint 
enterprise for any collateral crime he foresaw as a possibility may serve the purpose 
of general deterrence for it gives the general public a signal that joining a criminal 
joint enterprise is something they should avoid. But such a deterrence goal is already 
targeted by punishing the defendant for the underlying crime. No extra benefit will be 
gained from having unfair crime labels and disproportionate punishments based on 
double constructive liability which collateral joint enterprise liability allows for. 
Unjust punishments lead to disutility as far as deterrence is concerned.118 
           Furthermore, allowing double constructive liability seems incapable of 
fulfilling the specific deterrence goal as well. The defendant in the context of 
extended joint enterprise has no control whatsoever over his perpetrator in committing 
the collateral crime; and the cost-benefit evaluation may not work in the mind of him 
over an act which he has no control. Special deterrence can only work well when 
those it aims to deter know the law or have a chance of guessing what the law might 
be, but most defendant had no idea that they could be liable for the collateral crime. 
Publicly available information about collateral joint enterprise liability is patchy and 
ad hoc119 and many who were convicted through collateral joint enterprise perceived 
the law only after having been convicted. People are much less likely to cooperate 
with the authorities if they take the law as unjust and unfair, and custodial sentences 
have been shown to increase, not reduce, reoffending.120 Specific deterrence goal 
																																																								
118 T J Miceli and K Segerson, "Punishing the Innocent along with the Guilty: The Economics of Individual versus 
Group Punishment" (2007) 36(1) Journal of Legal Studies 81; Contra, K W Simons, "Retributivists Need Not and 
Should Not Endorse the Subjectivist Account of Punishment" (2009) 109 Columbia Law Review Sidebar 1, at 9.   
119 Justice Committee, "Joint Enterprise: Follow Up" (Fourth Report of Session 2014-15, House of Commons, 
2014), at 10.  
120 Ibid, at 13; P H Robinson, "Does Criminal Law Deter? A Behavioural Science Investigation" (2004) 24(2) 
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would be better achieved if we adopt a fair and just scheme allowing fair labelling and 
proportionate punishment. 
            In addition, the argument that extended joint enterprise doctrine could relieve 
the prosecution from impossible proof burden is unconvincing. Joint enterprise 
liability has caused serious difficulties for juries due to its complexity and lack of 
clarity.121 It is reported that collateral joint enterprise liability has been the subject of a 
high number of appeals in recent years.122 Most of the difficulty has to do with the 
complexity of the rules, not with proving the facts or proving who did it.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               
This pragmatic consideration is unprincipled, even though it might make convictions 
easier to obtain. Any practical benefits are outweighed by fundamental principles of 
criminal justice. There are many cases where it is difficult for the prosecution to prove 
beyond reasonable doubt the required elements of a crime, but this does not mean that 
the fault element should be supplanted with one that is easier to prove—or with strict 
collective liability for the entire group. There is nothing to be gained by obtaining 
easy convictions at the cost of circumventing the core principles of justice. Failures of 
justice due to difficulties of proof in multi-party cases should be addressed directly 
and not by creating fictitious rule. 
We now know that Lords Steyn and Mustill (in R v Powell123) were mistaken 
in thinking they were bound to apply the evidential maxim of foresight of possibility 
as a substantive fault element in complicity (i.e. the were mistaken to think Sir Robin 
Cooke’s interpretation of the law as stated in Chan Wing-Siu v The Queen was right 
and that they were bound by it), but the difference between those Lords and the 																																																								
121 Justice Committee, "Joint Enterprise " (Eleventh Report of Session 2010-12, House of Commons, 2012) 10. 
122 It is reported in Justice Committee, "Joint Enterprise: Follow Up" (Fourth Report of Session 2014-15, House of 
Commons, 2014) at 16 that 22 per cent of all convictions appealed to the Court of Appeal in 2013 had an element 
of joint enterprise, which is regarded as a terrifying statistic 
123 [1999] 1 AC 1. 
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majority in Miller v The Queen is that those Lords were very open about the fact that 
they thought the law they were bound to state was extremely unfair.124  The difference 
between the decision in R v Jogee and the decision in Miller v The Queen is that R v 
Jogee interpreted the law so that it could be reconciled with centuries of common law 
precedents. Principles of justice akin to those mentioned by Gageler J125 and Kirby 
J126 and, more significantly by leading academic experts, also add weight to the case, 
but the decision in R v Jogee rests simply on an application of the historical 
precedents. It does not rest on policy arguments nor judicial activism, 127  but 
straightforwardly on legal interpretation. Similarly, the decision of the Supreme Court 
of the United States in Rosemond v U.S. draws on centuries of precedents including 
the English law authorities cited by Learned Hand J in United States v. Peoni,128 
rather than policy arguments, to hold that the mental element in complicity is 
intention.129 Policy arguments are the business of parliament, not that of judges who 
are meant to interpret law according to precedents and principles of justice. United 
States v Peoni itself was argued as a natural probable consequence case, but Learned 
Hand J tracing the law back as far as Bracton held that the mental element in 
complicity is intention. The Supreme Court of the United States in Rosemond v U.S. 
held that Learned Hand’s statement of the law was correct and applied it. Moreover, a 																																																								
124 Baker, above note 3, ch. 6.  
125 Miller v The Queen [2016] HCA 30, where Gageler J states, ‘To hold a secondary party liable for a crime 
committed by a primary party which the secondary party foresaw but did not intend does not measure up against 
the informing principle of the common law “that there should be a close correlation between moral culpability and 
legal responsibility”. In the language of King CJ, who stood against the introduction of the doctrine of extended 
joint criminal enterprise into the common law of Australia during the period after Chan Wing-Siu and before 
McAuliffe, the doctrine results in “the unjust conviction of persons of crimes of which they could not be said, in 
any true sense, to be guilty”.’   
126 Clayton v The Queen [2006] 168 A Crim R 174, 224-225. 
127 Lord Toulson is not one for judicial activism, even when it might bring about a fair result. See for example his 
judgment in R (on the application of Nicklinson) v Ministry of Justice [2012] EWHC 2381, para 79.  
128 [1938] 100 F 2d. 401. 
129 [2014] 134 S.Ct. 1240. 
	 39 
number of the world’s leading criminal law experts have held that the precedents 
require intention.130  If anything, the decision in Miller v The Queen helps to highlight 
the injustices and the urgent need for law reform in Australia.   
            In light of the unsound decision in Miller v The Queen, it is hoped that the 
relevant parliaments in Australia will consider wholesale reform. If that were to 
happen, this paper argues that the principled way forward is to completely abolish the 
doctrine of extended joint enterprise  and replace it with lesser offences of risking 
another’s collateral offending. Such an offence is justified by a risk-taking rationale. 
A participant in a criminal joint enterprise should be liable for risking collateral crime 
by joining the underlying crime. The participant’s continuing participation in the 
underlying crime with a foresight that the perpetrator might commit the collateral 
offence increases the risk of the collateral crime being perpetrated. If the participant 
did not join the joint underlying foundation criminal enterprise such as a bank robbery 
or gang violence, the perpetrator might not have been willing to perpetrate the 
underlying crime on his own and thus the risk of the perpetrator perpetrating a 
collateral crime would have been reduced simply due to him not being willing to 
perpetrate the underlying crime on his own. Such risk-taking does not warrant full 
criminal liability for the collateral crime committed by the perpetrator, but it is 
enough to justify some sort of criminal liability. The joint enterprise of the underlying 
offence is the background of the collateral offending. As a consequence, the accessory 
acted positively in setting that background.  
The actus reus of this new proposed crime is joining a risky criminal venture 
to do an underlying crime,131 and the mental element requires subjective recklessness 																																																								
130 See Baker, above note 3; Kadish, above note 8, 378-379; G Williams, ‘Complicity, Purpose and the Draft 
Code: Part 1’, (1990) Crim LR 4; G Williams, ‘Complicity, Purpose and the Draft Code: Part 2’, (1990) Crim LR 
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as to the commission of the collateral crime. If the collateral offending by the 
perpetrator is fundamentally different from what the defendant has foreseen or 
contemplated, the defendant will not be liable for that offence because he does not 
risk it with awareness. This new crime would allow fair labelling and proportionate 
punishment. The offender would not be labelled as a perpetrator of the collateral 
offence, but a remote participant in the collateral offence. The punishment would 
correspond with the harmfulness of D’s remote participation and his lower level of 
culpability. The punishment for the new lesser offence of risking another perpetrating 
a collateral crime would be left to some extent to the discretion of the judge.  But 
what is clear is that any punishment would have to be calibrated with the collateral 
offence D foresaw as a possibility. Thus risking a collateral crime of murder should 
be punished more severely than risking a collateral crime of theft. However, the 
punishment of a person under this new lesser offence of risking another perpetrating a 
collateral crime should not exceed that of an assister or encourager because there is no 
actual assistance or encouragement to the collateral crime on D’s part. 
V Conclusion 
 
It would be inapt to introduce new material here in the conclusion. Nevertheless, to 
make a strong conclusion it is helpful to acknowledge that some jurisdictions 
																																																																																																																																																														
131 Similar claim can be found in the situation of remote harm where a person whose conduct is in itself harmless, 
but may be prohibited because it may in some manner creating a risk that some other people will make their 
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in some sense affirms or underwrites the intervening actor’s subsequent choice. See A P Simester and Andreas von 
Hirsch, Crimes, Harms, and Wrongs (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2011) at 70-88. See also A P Simester and A von 
Hirsch, “Remote Harms and Non-Constitutive Crimes” (2009) 28 Crim. Justice Ethics 89, 99. Baker, above note 
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developed independent extended joint enterprise mechanisms. 132  Some of these 
require not more than negligence as the fault element, because early statutes adopted 
the natural probable consequence maxim as substantive fault doctrine in these 
provisions.133 However, these early statutory enactments that were enacted in a time 
when the death penalty and the felony murder rule were in full force. Moreover, they 
were enacted in a time when there were no clear distinctions drawn between 
recklessness, intention and oblique intention as substantive fault elements. They are 
found only in a few jurisdictions and by and large applied to facts where there was 
intention and therefore this probably has kept the media’s focus of reform. Some U.S. 
states, as do some Australian states, have these sorts of extended joint enterprise 
doctrines, but these olds statutes are an accident of history and the injustice they 
provide for should not be taken as a standard of justice in the 21st century. Kadish 
writing about these statues has likened extended joint enterprise complicity to the 
felony murder rule. Professor Kadish states, ‘It also shares a resemblance to the 
American felony-murder rule, long since abandoned in England, which is a particular 
application of the lesser-crime doctrine to murder: a killing committed in the course 
of a felony (nowadays only certain felonies) becomes murder even if, apart from the 
felony, it would be manslaughter or not criminal at all.’ Kadish also recognises that 
this form of liability was never part of the law of complicity in England. It also was 
never part of the law in the non-Code states in Australia.  
The only theoretical justification given in Miller v The Queen for trying to 
show why extended joint enterprise is fair was Simester’s change of normative 
position theory. However this theory is simply a rule akin to the felony murder rule—																																																								
132 Hemming, above note 67; J F Decker, ‘The Mental State Requirement for Accomplice Liability in American 
Criminal Law’, (2009) 60 SCL Rev 237. 
133 Baker, above note 3, ch. 2.  
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it is a statement of what is going to be applied, but it does not supply a positive 
justification to explain the fairness of holding a person liable for murder simply for 
associating with another in an underlying crime such as robbery with foresight that 
person might kill or cause GBH to a guard during the robbery. The change of 
normative position theory is not supported with argument when argument is clearly 
needed—Simester’s change of normative position justification is a non sequitur.  
The judges in the majority in Miller v The Queen misquote Foster and 
Stephen, because the passages cited referred to accessorial liability for unintended 
consequences flowing from an act that was intentionally encouraged and to cases 
where different means were used to achieve a result that was intended by both parties. 
There is nothing in Foster or Stephen that supports the decision in Miller v The 
Queen. The majority in Miller v The Queen also seem to focus on out-dated policy 
points that were made in passing in R v Powell and English, without paying any 
intention to the concerns raised by the Lords about the injustice the Chan Wing-Sui 
interpretation of the law was causing.  
 Finally, while not the business of the courts, law reform seems long overdue 
in Australia. More robust law reform is required than has been presented by the law 
reform bodies in Victoria and NSW. Miller v The Queen has made law reform a 
matter of urgency. Double constructive liability manifested in extended joint 
enterprise doctrine attaches too much criminal liability to the defendant and therefore 
infringes the principles of fair labelling and proportionate punishment.  A new lesser 
offence of risking another’s collateral offending would enable us to label and punish 
the defendant fairly according to the harmfulness of his own conduct and his personal 
culpability. Such fair criminalisation would achieve the deterrence goal better as well.  
 
